



*Capacity Development  
for Peacebuilding:  
– an international network approach –*



*Edited by Kazuo Takahashi*



Rotary Peace Center



# **Education for Peacebuilding: From Problem Solving to Critical Interrogations of the Liberal Peace<sup>1</sup> at Bradford**

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This paper examines a number of distinct but related topics. First, it provides a brief outline of the various ways in which the subject of peacebuilding is covered in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, focusing in particular on provision at the postgraduate level. Second, the paper outlines some of the different perspectives on what constitutes effective peacebuilding and questions the utility of the one-size fits-all approach that characterizes contemporary peacebuilding practice. Third, the paper provides a brief critique of the ways in which the problematization of weak and failed states as threats to the developed world risks producing policy frameworks in which security is privileged over solidarism. Fourth, we argue that education for peacebuilding should not simply be focused on technical problem-solving issues – such as how to do security sector reform – but should also be characterized by a normative commitment to emancipation and a willingness to engage in a critical interrogation of fundamental assumptions about the nature of world order and the role of peacebuilding in the construction and maintenance of that order. Finally, we make a number of suggestions designed to improve the ways in which collaboration between the Rotary Centers and between Rotary and the Centers might be improved as to better promote research on and education for peacebuilding.

## **The Department of Peace Studies and Education for Peacebuilding**

The Department of Peace Studies hosts almost 400 students from more than forty countries and from every continent. One of the great strengths of the Department is the diversity, quality and experience of its student body. Members of staff in the Department cover a wide range of disciplinary backgrounds and areas of research interest.

Research within the Department is mainly organized around five research centers:

The Africa Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies.

The Bradford Disarmament Research Centre.

The Centre for Conflict Resolution.

The Centre for International Co-operation and Security.

The International Centre for Participation Studies.

In exploring how Bradford teaches about peacebuilding it is critical to understand that this large and diverse Department does not have one standardized curriculum. Instead, the Department offers a number of courses in different aspects of peace and international relations. At the MA level, for example, we currently offer courses on Peace Studies, Conflict Resolution and International Politics and Security. The Department has also recently introduced a new MA in African Peace and Conflict Studies. Nor is research and teaching in the Department influenced by a particular definition of

peacebuilding. Members of staff remain free to structure their work around the particular themes and intellectual traditions that interest them.

This is not to suggest that researching peacebuilding is a low priority for the Department. On the contrary, it is fair to say that each research center views peacebuilding as part of its work and an important area of research. In addition, the Department is also home to a number of journals that engage with issues pertinent to peacebuilding:

*a. International Peacekeeping*

This is a well-established journal that has been in existence since 1994. The journal is edited by Professor Michael Pugh and is now published by Routledge. The number of issues published per year has gradually increased to the point where, now, five issues per year are produced. The journal has a focus on the theory and practice of peacekeeping, and related policies at an international level. The journal seeks to encourage innovative research and debate in the areas of international relations, security studies, history, international law, anthropology, and conflict resolution.

*b. Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*

This is a well-established journal that has been in existence since 1995. The journal is co-edited by Dr Jim Whitman. It is an electronic journal and is updated regularly rather than published periodically. There is no subscription fee and the journal is entirely open access. The journal currently has about 5,000 regular readers (75% academics, 25% practitioners) from across the world and these generate about 110,000 hits per month.

The journal encompasses all aspects of humanitarian assistance, from early warning and emergency provision to post-conflict peace-building and the transition to development. This is inclusive of law, politics, the military, logistics and the work of national and international organizations.

*c. Internet Journal of African Studies*

This was launched at the University in 1996 but only ran for two issues. However, it has been decided to re-launch the journal under the auspices of the Africa Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. The objective of the journal is to provide publication opportunities for partners and academic colleagues in Africa.

In practical terms the Department's approach to the study of peace means that each member of staff, each centre and each journal editor can bring their own understanding of peacebuilding to bear on the subjects they teach and research. Some centers however, do have a common working definition they use for peacebuilding, most notably the Centre for Conflict Resolution which understands peacebuilding in nonviolent terms. The Centre has also attempted to combine academic study of the topic with the development of practical skills related to peacebuilding. For example, in one module, students work in teams to track conflicts in eight different countries each of which has ongoing peacekeeping operations. Students are then asked to map what peacebuilding activities are taking place, and with collaboration and coordination in mind, to design their own intervention

with a large INGO. They are then asked to write up a report with analysis of the situation, rationale for their project, costs and practical strategies for implementation, etc and present this for their final project.

The Africa Centre also undertakes education for peacebuilding efforts offering an MA in Peace and Conflict Studies in Africa, and a variety of national peace education and arts for peace programs and conferences. The centre focuses both on civil society and governmental agencies. Both the Africa Centre and the Conflict Resolution Department offer study trips, for example to Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka which largely focus on current peacebuilding efforts and offer students an opportunity to speak with local peacebuilders and to explore the conflict and potential solutions from a variety of 'on the ground' viewpoints.

While the various centers certainly engage in both research on peacebuilding and peacebuilding education, the different centers do not necessarily work to a common definition of peacebuilding. In many respects this is a key strength of the Department as it permits a diversity of approaches and thinking that students can benefit from. At the same time however, the Department is currently engaged in broader debates that involve trying to think through key principles associated with its teaching and its external identity: Intra-departmental dialogue on the topic of peacebuilding is certainly one of those areas where there may be potential for further reflection and debate over the content of teaching and the nature of our research activity.

In many ways, of course, the differences in approach found within the Department at Bradford reflect the highly contentious status of the term peacebuilding and the varying opinions within the field about the best way to undertake peacebuilding efforts.

### **Contesting Peacebuilding**

The post-Cold War era has seen a remarkable increase in peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities. Indeed, at the end of 2004 there were more than 60,000 peacekeepers deployed in 16 missions around the world.<sup>2</sup> Yet despite the tremendous amount of such activity now going on, it nevertheless remains the case that there is no settled definition of either peacebuilding as a concept or what technical activities it should consist of. In *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992 the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali emphasized a technicist and problem-solving approach to peacebuilding that primarily focused on activities such as:

disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.<sup>3</sup>

Though the activities highlighted above are indeed important, there is a blindspot within its scope and vision as the focus is not primarily on building lasting or sustainable peace. For these purposes, John Paul Lederach provides us with a more far-reaching definition of peacebuilding 'the capacity to imagine and generate constructive responses and initiatives that, while rooted in the day-to-day

challenges of violence, transcend and ultimately break the grips of those destructive patterns and cycles.’<sup>4</sup>

Given this more inclusive conception, peacebuilding can easily be understood as compatible with a range of educative and nonviolent philosophies, which focus on social justice. Peacebuilding in this view can embody processes that change power relationships, and patterns of communication, as well as acknowledging the need to challenge globalizing and militarizing forces from inside as well as outside the area in question.

Nick Lewer from the Conflict Resolution Centre in Bradford emphasizes that, ‘INGO approaches to peacebuilding should be non-violent, and there’s a long and recorded history of individuals and groups working non-violently in war and other situations of violent conflict.’<sup>5</sup> Indeed, Lewer goes on to illustrate the sheer scope of issues covered in the nonviolent tradition:

From within the ‘peace’ literature there are also extensive texts which explored and described peaceful ways of combating violence and the militarization of society, reconstructing communities and building peaceful relationships from individual, group and social movement perspectives. Most of the texts, as well as examining the national and international historical, political, economic and structural perspectives of conflict, also give some attention to the psychological and social causes of violence, and techniques of tackling them.<sup>6</sup>

Authors like Lewer refer to pacifist greats such as Delight or Gandhi in support of a normative project aimed at extending and refining the use of nonviolent peacebuilding strategies.<sup>7</sup>

Yet the emphasis on pacifism is not universally shared even amongst those who take quite radical approaches to the challenges of peacebuilding. Indeed, the incorporation of nonviolent direct action and support for the mobilization of radical nonviolent social movements is rarely incorporated into peacebuilding strategies. For example, the philosophy of cosmopolitan peacebuilding outlined by Mary Kaldor critiques the traditional top-down approach to peacebuilding which privileges engagement with warlords and predatory elites and argues that externals need to focus more effort on empowering and legitimizing the ‘islands of civility’ in societies. Nevertheless, this approach does not necessarily address the role of social movements nor does it preclude the use of force as part of a project of cosmopolitan law enforcement as in Kosovo.<sup>8</sup>

Other commentators have emphasized the need to focus peacebuilding efforts on improving the political capacity of societies to manage tensions, even when these tensions may be rooted in long-term structural factors.<sup>9</sup> A variant of this approach is one that emphasizes the importance of building effective institutions of law, security and public administration (although in some analyses institution building is given precedence over political liberalization).<sup>10</sup> This is more generally reflected in the turn to the ‘good governance’ agenda which has now come to dominate approaches to the reform of weak and post-conflict states. The emphasis in such approaches, is on reforming and improving the institutions of governance rather than focusing on conflict resolution per se, individual psychology, or with the way in which the structures of the global economy may influence the prospects for

peacebuilding inside states. Alternatively, the 'developmental peacekeeping' model places a priority on human security and enhancing economic development via the promotion of extended public works programs that utilize labor-based methodologies particularly as a vehicle for the 'skilling' and reintegration of ex-combatants into society.<sup>11</sup>

These however, remain prescriptive aspirations for peacebuilding. In reality, as Oliver Richmond emphasizes in his book *The Transformation of Peace* there are 'graduations' in peacebuilding ranging from the use of coercive force and top-down approaches to grassroots and locally led initiatives. Exactly where the emphasis is placed in specific peacebuilding operations is therefore, a function of time, the interests of external powers, the extent to which 'peace' is contested and the broader operations of local and global politics. At the same time however, these differences in the specific strategies employed in particular peacebuilding operations can mask the fact that peacebuilding projects take place within a dominant 'liberal peace' paradigm that emphasizes the building of market democracies as the path to peace.<sup>12</sup> Much the same point has been made by Paris who notes that:

a single paradigm - liberal internationalism - appears to guide the work of most international agencies engaged in peace building. The central tenet of this paradigm is the assumption that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states, is market democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy. Peace building is in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering an experiment that involves transplanting western styles of social, political and economic organization into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalization.<sup>13</sup>

One example of this philosophy can be found in the words of the head of the recently created US Office for Reconstruction and Stabilisation, and these neatly illustrate the ambiguities that arise from the urge to save strangers by imposing pre-ordained solutions:

In many cases we're really redefining the fabric of a society, certainly, in most cases, the social, political and economic systems ... [we have to] get into a process of tearing apart the old if we are to unleash the forces for openness and competition...of developing the infrastructure for a market democracy - the physical, the economic, the political and the legal infrastructure. And this isn't just a question of writing laws or building institutions; it's really rethinking the way society functions.<sup>14</sup>

The effectiveness and applicability of such conceptual 'blueprints' to postwar settings in various parts of the world is highly questionable. Monica Llamazares points out in her critique of these trends toward a conceptual peacebuilding monoculture that such attitudes are likely to exclude local voices and to be unreflective. Simply put, she argues that this approach is "too broad", "too generic and western", and "too dominant".<sup>15</sup> Indeed, the limited sociological and ethnographic work conducted on these issues indicates that interactions between the multiplicity of international agencies and local constituencies are more complex than is traditionally assumed by externals.<sup>16</sup> Pouligny, for example, notes the manifold effects of contact between outsiders and local communities, the negotiations often betraying mutual incomprehension or manipulation. At its worst, international intervention in post-conflict economies can actually exacerbate the challenges of transformation

with rent-seekers and entrepreneurs benefiting from the international presence and consolidating wartime fortunes while the rest of the population may be untouched by international aid or encounter the discrimination of aid hierarchies.<sup>17</sup>

The extent to which this impacts on the ability of peacebuilding operations to forge enduring peace is a subject of some debate. For example, a RAND Corporation study of eight UN peacebuilding missions concluded that the majority were successful.<sup>18</sup> In contrast, however, Paris examined the effects of 14 peacebuilding missions launched since the end of the Cold War and concluded that, even in those cases where large-scale hostilities have not resumed, the record of peacebuilding operations in actually establishing a *sustainable* peace is poor. Indeed, he suggests that in several states, 'the very strategy that peacebuilders have employed to consolidate peace – political and economic liberalization – seems paradoxically, to have increased the likelihood of renewed violence'.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, Dory has noted that of the 38 formal peace accords signed between January 1988 and December 1998, 31 failed to survive more than three years.<sup>20</sup>

### **Contesting the Securitization of Underdevelopment**

It is worth considering such critiques in the light of recent turns in international policy on development, weak states and peacebuilding, and a good place to start is the report of the Secretary-General's High Level Panel on Threats published in 2005. In many respects it represents a high water-mark of liberal internationalism concerned as it is to delineate the many predations experienced by the poor, particularly those in the developing world. Thus, the High Level Panel is at pains to highlight the fact that

- over a billion people lack access to clean water.
- over 2 billion have no access to adequate sanitation and more than 3 million die every year from water-related diseases.
- 14 million people including six million children die every year from hunger.
- in 2000 there were 842 million undernourished people in the world.
- In sub-Saharan Africa average life expectancy has declined from 50 to 46 since 1990.<sup>21</sup>

At the same time however, there is a very particular conception of the relationship between underdevelopment, state collapse, threat and security that animates the report of the High Level Panel and which it is important to interrogate if we are to critically examine peacebuilding in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, it is only by doing this that we can begin to reflect on the broader role (and potentialities) of education for peacebuilding in a post-Cold War, post-9/11 world.

#### *The securitization of underdevelopment*

Western development policy has always been linked to security but the nature of this linkage has been subject to change over time.<sup>22</sup> For instance, Robert McNamara's 'war on poverty' at the World Bank in 1972 was driven by the notion that the poor were more likely to go communist.<sup>23</sup> However, in the new aid discourse the global poor and the weak states they reside in are not only securitized because of the indirect threats they present to the developed world via the chessboard politics of geostrategy (although this still occurs) but the poor themselves have become constructed

as agents of threat. In particular, their societal implosion, their uncontrolled movement, their informal exchanges, their diseases and their supposed rejection of modernity are deemed to be vehicles for the export of chaos.

Moreover, this contemporary securitization of underdevelopment has become acutely heightened in the aftermath of 9/11. The balance of analysis has switched even more profoundly towards one which emphasizes the developing world either as a *source* of multiple threats or at best, an equal partner in mutual vulnerability. Indeed, what is notable is the way in which a whole panoply of problems tend to be conflated together to create a discursive linkage between poverty, weak states, civil conflict and the export of crime and disorder - with terrorism as the most extreme manifestation. This has become the dominant frame in which the challenges of both development and peacebuilding are contextualized -- and securitized. The Report of the High Level Panel is no exception:

Today, more than ever before, threats are interrelated and a threat to one is a threat to all. The mutual vulnerability of weak and strong states has never been clearer...International terrorist groups prey on weak states for sanctuary...Civil war, disease and poverty increase the likelihood of state collapse and facilitate the spread of organized crime, thus also increasing the risk of terrorism and proliferation due to weak States ...<sup>24</sup>

Similarly, for the UK's Department for International Development in *Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A Strategy for Security and Development* 'we live in an interdependent world...but these close connections can also give rise to threats when conflict and crime and environmental pollution cross borders'.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, as the report goes on to note:

While there is no evidence that poverty directly contributes to terrorism, or that terrorists are from poorer communities, terrorist leaders do exploit the issue of poverty as a means of mobilizing popular support and legitimizing their actions...DFID supports poverty reduction, good governance and social inclusion in many poor countries at risk of terrorism...Failures of governance can radicalize groups and, where territorial control is lacking, provide safe havens and bases for launching terrorists attacks...More needs to be done to improve our analysis of the links between poverty and the long-term risk factors associated with terrorism.<sup>26</sup>

Tony Blair the British Prime Minister arguably expressed the predominant image and concern at the heart of such analyses:

Once chaos and strife have got a grip on a region or a country, trouble is soon exported. Out of such regions and countries come humanitarian tragedies, centers for trafficking in weapons, drugs and people, havens for criminal organizations, and sanctuaries for terrorists...The dragon's teeth are planted in the fertile soil of wrongs unrighted, of disputes left to fester for years, of failed states, of poverty and deprivation.<sup>27</sup>

As already noted then, this is a framing in which intervention to secure the poor is predicated on a construction either of the developing world as a source of threats or as an equal partner in mutual vulnerability. There are two issues this raises. The first concerns the extent to which even the image

of mutual vulnerability is accurate and the second concerns the policy imperatives that both underpin such framings and follow from them.

(j) Mutual Vulnerability in an Asymmetric World

The assumption of mutual vulnerability is, in reality, somewhat questionable. Indeed, what is remarkable is the extent to which the 'zones of peace' remain, for the most part, just that, and the extent to which health, wealth and welfare in the developed world remain immune to the predations visited upon the developing. To the extent that a revolt of the poor has occurred, it has (as usual) been a revolt of the poor on the poor.

Indeed, many of the imagined threats are not so much threats as opportunities. Thus, refugees and migration largely represent an economic boon bringing skills, youth and entrepreneurial endeavor to ageing developed societies.<sup>28</sup> The threat, if it exists at all, is in fact to developing world states that see the young and the skilled leave to populate the health sectors and the IT industries of the developed world.<sup>29</sup> Similarly, globalized illicit networks are as much, indeed, far more, a source of cut-price goods, profit and opportunity for the developed world than they are of instability whether they be providing cheap drugs, cheap sex workers, cheap migrant labor, hooky trainers or cheap conflict diamonds.

Furthermore, to the extent that instability is transmitted at all, it is in a significantly diluted form. Thus, the majority of terrorist events, the majority of AIDS victims and the majority of global environmental catastrophes happen in the developing world. Moreover, on the scale of global threats, the 3,000 who died in the attack on the World Trade Centre are dwarfed by the 20,000 people who die from poverty *each day*.<sup>30</sup> Horrific as it was, 9/11 did not impact on the fact that average life expectancy in the US (77 years) remains over double that of a citizen of Sierra Leone (34.3 years).<sup>31</sup> **The developed and the developing world do not so much inhabit a global world of interconnected threats and vulnerabilities as a world of profoundly asymmetric threats and vulnerabilities, one in which the poor in the developing world experiences severe threats and one in which the rich in the developed world are more secure, more wealthy and more healthy than ever.**

Moreover, the metaphors of overspill and spread and contagion that dominate contemporary imaginings of the development-security nexus are intrinsically problematic. Such imagery locates underdevelopment and state failure at the centre of a web of networks that subvert both the local and global rule of law – networks of crime, terror and unnamed threats that reach out to envelop the developed world. The conception at work here, is of complex networks that, simultaneously, operate in a linear direction, outwards from the failed state/region. In contrast, it is more useful to describe such networks as non-linear. There is no clear source, no beginning or end-point, for the global networks that connect the mobile phone used by combatants in the DRC, who exploit the coltan, which goes to the firms, who manufacture the phones, which allow the combatants to conduct operations that permit them to mine more coltan.<sup>32</sup> It is thus problematic to frame the networks of global interconnectedness in term of an inside/outside dichotomy – whether it be the division between the developed and the developing state, between the legal and the illegal, or whether, as Mary Kaldor would have it, a purported division between global networks of the civil and the uncivil

that exist in the same territorial space but 'side by side'.<sup>33</sup> Such networks do not exist *side by side* – they inter-connect and overlap, with the licit fusing into the illicit and vice versa. In a very real sense, these are not distinct networks at all, but one network that continuously re-shapes and re-forms in response to multifarious pressures and feedback loops such as the changing geography of local and global regulation and the changing geography of peacebuilding interventions.<sup>34</sup>

(ii) Peacebuilding and the Responsibility to Protect

Of course, it can be argued that debates over whether threats are mutual or asymmetric are rather academic and that what matters is the fact that there is a renewed concern to intervene, to rebuild failed states, to promote human security and even to learn the lessons of past interventions. However, our point is precisely that the specific form of such interventions is influenced by the way in which poverty, weak states and civil conflicts are problematized. And at best, as in The Report of The High Level Panel, solidarism with the poor is justified not merely in its own right but as part of a project to hermetically seal the zones off peace off from the instabilities of the poor. At worst, the risk that flows from this is that the language of solidarism will be used to justify interventions that are more clearly animated by the securitizing logics of the war on drugs or the war on terror.

For example, the idea that the neoliberal project has been taken too far and has had the counter-productive effect of eroding state capacity and legitimacy – a traditional refrain of the left – has now been taken up by realists. Thus, Fukuyama's *State Building* signs up to earlier analyses that have emphasized the way in which neopatrimonial regimes used external conditionality as an excuse for cutting back on modern state sectors whilst expanding the scope of the neopatrimonial state.<sup>35</sup> He has also become a belated convert to the idea that, under the Washington Consensus, the state-building agenda was given insufficient emphasis.<sup>36</sup> Thus, the New Right analysis is one that emphasizes strong states and local empowerment. Even (especially) the Bush administration concluded in its National Security Strategy of 2002 that 'America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing states'.<sup>37</sup>

However, the New Right analysis is explicitly situated as a response to the apparently new global dangers unleashed by 9/11. As Fukuyama notes, 'the failed state problem... was seen previously as largely a humanitarian or human rights issue', now it has been constructed as a problem of Western security.<sup>38</sup> In addition, state-building and local ownership somehow manages to encompass approval for the idea that on key areas such as central banking – 'ten bright technocrats can be air-dropped into a developing country and bring about massive changes for the better in public policy'.<sup>39</sup> The emphasis is also on state capacity for enforcement, 'the ability to send someone with a uniform and a gun to force people to comply with the state's laws'<sup>40</sup> and to maintain the integrity of borders too easily traversed by networked crime and terror.

Thus, what structures the debate about addressing abuse or underdevelopment in this perspective is not the abuse or underdevelopment per se but, more importantly, its links with all those multiple threats posed to the developed world. A continuum is thus created for external intervention, that ranges not merely from the overthrow of Saddam in Iraq but which also structures debate about Somalia, or the need to address shadow trade; and interventionary strategies – whether designed

to address WMD, AIDS or collapsed states – are thus explicitly framed as prophylactic strategies designed to protect the West from terror, disease, refugees, crime and disorder.

The risk is therefore that the ‘responsibility to protect’ becomes more about protecting the developed world from the ‘virus of disorder’ supposedly exported by the poor in the developing world and that this structures policy in ways that are contradictory – with security being given precedence at the expense of solidarism. Peacebuilding in this context then, risks becoming co-opted as a security mechanism which in the words of a IISS report on Somalia, is concerned with ‘inoculating failed or failing states against occupation by Al Qaida’<sup>41</sup> rather than with promoting the common good. As Duffield and Waddell have noted, ‘the worry is that ‘their’ security and development are becoming important only insofar as they are a means towards ‘ours’.<sup>42</sup> For example:

- Following US allegations of support for terrorism, the operations of a Saudi charity operating in Somalia were suspended throwing over 2,600 orphans onto the streets.<sup>43</sup>
- Whilst the US has increased aid, much of the direction of this aid has been determined by the priorities of the war on terror whilst bilateral trade arrangements have been used to reward key allies in the war on terror.<sup>44</sup> In Pakistan for example, US aid has risen from \$1.7 million in 2001 to \$275 million in 2005.<sup>45</sup> As one US commentator has noted, ‘The administrations ‘global war on terrorism’ is the main determinant of the distribution of economic aid – not development needs, not humanitarian disasters, not hunger....’<sup>46</sup>
- The US National Security Strategy, the OECD and the EU all highlight development assistance as a strategic tool in the war against terrorism.<sup>47</sup>
- Concern at the way porous borders and informal economies may have been exploited by terror networks in the Sahel has led the US to develop a Pan-Sahel Initiative, focused on reinforcing borders and enhancing surveillance. Not only has the view of the region as a hotbed of terrorism been questioned, but the emphasis on cutting of shadow trading networks that have ‘become the economic lifeblood of Saharan peoples’ has been criticized as potentially counterproductive<sup>48</sup> – as opposed for instance, to focusing on dealing with the underlying dynamics driving such networks.

However, the problem with the merger of solidarism and security is not simply that solidarism risks being superseded by military security. It is also the case that solidarism has most frequently manifested itself in the promotion of a human security agenda that provides a powerful *legitimization* for the extension of military and regulatory intervention inside the developing world state. Indeed, as Vankovska has noted, militaries around the globe have not rejected but rather embraced human security rhetoric, particularly when legitimizing armed intervention. One effect of this is that issues of politics and power inherent in intervention (military or otherwise) are removed (or at least downplayed) through a portrayal of intervention as above politics and devoid of interests other than a concern to enforce international law and cosmopolitan human rights.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, at its worst, the discourse of solidarism and human security has become a form of Orwellian newspeak that both masks the interests at work in interventions such as Iraq or Afghanistan and contributes to the production of amnesia over the neglect of human security in cases such as Darfur or the Anglo-American response to the Israeli attacks in Lebanon.

Moreover, whilst there are certainly vigorous debates in the academic and policy literature over what constitutes human security<sup>50</sup>, *in practice*, a quite anaemic conception of human security has been pursued by externals - one in which the discourse of human security has actually operated as a framework for promoting a combination of rights-based law and regulation/reregulation/deregulation to embed neoliberalism as the only conceivable vehicle for development. This is not to deny that there has been an attempt to reformulate the Washington Consensus to incorporate avowedly pro-poor, pro-human security policies. However, this has, in reality, done little to alter the basic neoliberal framework of the dominant development paradigm.<sup>51</sup> In part, this is because attempts at reform have been resisted or watered down. For example, mention of the Millennium Development Goals was eliminated from the UN's New York summit declaration in September 2005 as a result of US spoiling tactics.<sup>52</sup> However, it is also the case that apparently more progressive reforms in donor practice have often produced little more than a reformulation of the mechanisms of influence through which much the same prescriptions for development and peacebuilding are recycled. For example, there has certainly been a notable shift in language and practice away from the overt conditionality of structural adjustment and towards a language of 'partnership' with the state (and pro-poor advocacy groups nurtured by donors). Unfortunately though, this has tended to mask an attempt to extend donor influence via 'post-conditionality' regimes that aim to embed a much more pervasive form of external control through direct donor involvement in national policy-making committees<sup>53</sup> or through the imposition of outside specialists in national ministries.<sup>54</sup>

Consequently, as Grayson has noted, to the extent that freedom from want has been incorporated into the human security agenda it has been 'configured around neoliberal models of growth, integration and governance ... Stressing deregulation, privatisation, free trade and economic growth at the macro-level'.<sup>55</sup> Aid supplicants then, do not get to choose regulation *à la carte*. Democracy and neoliberalism come as a package and there is little freedom for societies to opt for anything other than free markets. The end result is that reform is not organic to societies (even when it comes laden with the language of empowerment) but is, rather, experienced by locals as an alien imposition to be resisted, evaded or co-opted into existing mechanisms of power and exploitation.

Not only is this problematic in principle but, as Amy Chua has demonstrated, the combination of democracy and free markets is often a virulent one that can serve to embed the wealth and power of minority groups and exacerbate economic division.<sup>56</sup> This might be tolerable if there was good evidence to suggest such reforms were ultimately successful in promoting meaningful development and sustainable security. However, as Willett has noted with respect to Africa, the widespread application of neoliberal policies has 'intensified horizontal inequalities (political, social, cultural, and economic), weakened indigenous institutional capacities, increased indebtedness, and rendered countries more prone to the external shocks of currency and commodity prices'.<sup>57</sup> For example, GDP per capita for sub-Saharan Africa has fallen from \$660 in 1980 to \$563 in 2000.<sup>58</sup> Similarly, the evidence that deregulating/reregulating to formally integrate local economies into global markets produces benefits for growth and for the poor is at the very least debatable. Growth may be a function of more specific factors and growth under the neoliberal model risks exacerbating conditions for the poor who benefit less from any growth gains that may occur.<sup>59</sup>

Thus, any impulse to protect the poor stemming from the human security perspective is *constrained* by a particular ideology of what markets mean, how they should operate and what kind of law is required to promote this orthodoxy. This has significant implications for attempts to build peace – not least because there is evidence that peace processes that address economic redistribution have a better chance of long-term success.<sup>60</sup>

The ways in which this synthesis between the security imperatives of the developed world, solidarist concerns with the poor and the current re-validation of the neoliberal model play themselves out will only really become clear with the test of time of course. However, what seems to be emerging at the moment is, at best, a variable geometry approach to weak and post-conflict states. Some, like Iraq and Afghanistan become the object of heightened discourses of threat producing highly militarized intervention strategies that prioritize order and security issues – whilst failing to address other factors such as the nature of shadow economies and their relationship to occupation and regulation. Indeed, at their extreme as in post-invasion Iraq, rather than witnessing the modification of discredited neoliberal models such objects of intervention experience even more virulent versions.<sup>61</sup> Others such as Sudan find themselves subject to a post-9/11 variant of the ‘new barbarism thesis’, in which the anarchy and extremes of violence they are deemed to exhibit, are simultaneously presented as a rationale for intervention but also as a reason for de-limiting intervention in the absence of acute imperatives for action provided by the logic of the war on terror. In between, there is a broad swathe of states from Sierra Leone to Angola to Liberia where specific intervention policies are less strongly influenced by the logic of the ‘war on terror’, but where broader policies are characterized by the switch to post-conditionality regimes ostensibly geared to producing social justice and effective states. In reality however, peacebuilding outcomes in such states are actually influenced by the precise ways in which the absence of an organic fit with host societies, the continued emphasis on the central tenets of neoliberalism and the strategies of resistance and evasion practiced by local actors play themselves out. In the short-term such interventions, as in Sierra Leone for example, may have the benefit of producing a negative peace that certainly marks a success of sorts. However, peacebuilding under these conditions also tends to take the form of a mutation in which the emergence of apparently new formal governance relationships between the state, the externals and the people actually masks a reproduction of the core conditions that led to conflict in the first place.

At the global level then, current peacebuilding practice is characterized by a mix of forcible intervention in some states followed by highly militarized post-conflict settings, relative indifference towards events in other states and the implementation of negative peace projects (albeit characterized by the replication of the conditions for violence) in yet another sub-set of states. At best, this mix of peacebuilding practices can be understood as ‘an integral part of the world-ordering project that has accompanied projects for stabilizing capitalism’<sup>62</sup> or as a key instrument of ‘liddism’, a global ‘control paradigm’ that attempts to keep the lid on insecurity without addressing the root causes.<sup>63</sup> In other words, it operates as a form of limited global poor relief and extensive monitoring and policing geared to preventing the poor re-exporting (imagined) disorder. At worst, in failing to effect radical transformation of local and global political economies, peacebuilding as liddism may be sowing the very seeds of its own failure.

This brings us neatly on to a consideration of the role of education for peacebuilding in a post 9/11 context.

### **The Role of Education in Strengthening Peacebuilding**

A significant contribution of education for peacebuilding processes, particularly given the context outlined above, may be in its radical critique of current peacebuilding activities and in its warnings that peacebuilding may be likely to serve the interests of the great powers, to be short sighted, underfunded, and geared towards disciplining the poor rather than transforming their conditions. How else could it be, when peacebuilding is largely funded by nations which themselves have thriving war economies and cultures, and which judging from the high levels of violence they experience at home, do not seem to deeply understand peace processes? It is worth noting in this context for instance, that US defense expenditure this year is expected to account for half of all global military expenditure whilst NATO accounts for roughly two thirds of global military expenditure and two thirds of global arms exports.<sup>64</sup> Similarly, whilst the UN currently spends some \$4.47 billion a year on its worldwide peacekeeping operations, this is dwarfed by the \$5.8 billion a month the US is spending on the occupation in Iraq.<sup>65</sup>

Can the international community be expected to be sensitive to power imbalances when those nations primarily influencing the processes that lead to international action have access to a disproportionate amount of political influence? Should we assume that they will be able to promote democracy abroad modeled on the 'successes' of their own systems, while at home they have declining participation and interest in democratic processes?

The point of this critique is not to paralyze the well-intentioned peacebuilder, nor to dismiss the importance of all peacebuilding activities. However, some of the implications of these trends should be particularly troubling for those interested in contributing to sustainable peace. Most of the tensions and contradictions raised here will not be resolved in this paper. However, they do serve a vital function: to highlight the point that critical perspectives and approaches are not synonymous with, nor do they necessarily inform, many of the current peacebuilding efforts. That realization opens up a space to consider how education can more significantly contribute to peacebuilding processes. Reflecting on the difficulties of modern peacebuilding in post-war situations Llamazares constructively frames the issue this way: 'The key question is not what peacebuilding is but what it can be'.<sup>66</sup>

Once we have moved from this starting point, we can ask the question which is at the heart of our concerns here: How can education contribute to peacebuilding within a peace studies or conflict resolution centre at the university level?

The answer to this question will necessarily be a normative one, informed and influenced by the educator's values and the vision of those participating in the institution. A key element in any program of education has to include a commitment to creating learning environments where participants can explore the full range of perspectives on a topic. Part of the normative element in any program of education for peacebuilding will therefore involve engaging students with the full

scope of the debates on peacebuilding. However, we believe it is both possible and necessary to study a wide range of perspectives on peacebuilding whilst also retaining a clear normative commitment to an emancipatory version of peacebuilding.

We believe there are three primary elements that most courses on peacebuilding have to engage with to varying degrees:

### **1. Technical/Problem-Solving Issues**

Education for peacebuilding cannot avoid dealing with the very immediate and technical problems involved in doing peacebuilding today and in really-existing societies. The range of potential issues are lengthy but include: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform, good governance, gender mainstreaming, aid sequencing, addressing the legacy of war economies, promoting economic development, democracy promotion etc etc.

However, engagement with technical problem-solving issues cannot take place in isolation. Inevitably, both the normative positions of peacebuilders and the fundamental assumptions they hold about the nature of global politics and the role of peacebuilding today, will inform thinking about exactly how to implement e.g. security sector reform. It is necessary therefore to engage with these issues as well.

### **2. Normative Elements**

As already noted above, any rigorous program of education in, and on, peacebuilding must be prepared to expose its students to a variety of normative positions on the role and functions of peacebuilding. However, we would also argue that this is not incompatible with retaining a clear identity and philosophy of peacebuilding education that informs research and teaching. For us, our guiding philosophy of peacebuilding would be encapsulated in Richmond's discussion of the emancipatory version of the liberal peace, or in Ken Booth's discussion of the relationship between security and emancipatory political projects:

One should, as far as possible, seek to pursue actions that create a virtuous circle of security and emancipation. This occurs when the pursuit of security (reducing the threats that impose life-determining conditions of insecurity on individuals and groups) promotes emancipation (freeing people from oppression and so giving them some opportunity to explore being more fully human), while the pursuit of emancipation (reducing structural oppression) promotes security (opening up spaces in which people can feel safer).<sup>67</sup>

This notion of emancipation links in with the way in which education on and for peacebuilding is actually done, implying, in particular, an emphasis on participatory education. As Paulo Friere points out, 'to substitute monologue, slogans, and communiques for dialog is to try to liberate...with the instruments of domestication'.<sup>68</sup> In the context of peacebuilding, both education and peacebuilding practice should be geared to supporting local participants in addressing not just war but structural violence, as well as promoting bottom-up peacebuilding and social justice. In other words, the aim should be to treat people as ends and not means in the process of building peace.

### **3. Critical Interrogation of Fundamental Assumptions**

A key element in any program of education for peacebuilding has to be a focus, not only on the technical, problem-solving demands of how to do security sector reform or to promote good governance but must also include a willingness to engage with both broader theory and approaches that ask fundamental questions about the role and nature of peacebuilding. One example might be Hardt and Negri's conception of the current nature of conflict as a state of global civil war and of the 'war on terror' as a process that consolidates Empire.<sup>69</sup> Understood in this conception, peacebuilding might be a challenge that needs to be undertaken at the global level.

Similarly, education for peacebuilding might seek to uncover the assumptions and motivations which underlie liberal internationalist approaches to peacebuilding. It may problematize this 'end of history' approach where liberal market economies, democracy and western values are uncritically accepted as the best way forward. From this perspective, the nature of the systems to either be restored or manufactured as a result of peacebuilding efforts need to be questioned and potentially challenged. As Philosopher Maynard Adams insightfully points out: 'The goal of education is not, of course, to restore tradition to any kind of sacrosanct status - though schooling should certainly situate students in historical and cultural context. The goal of... education is to provide them with critical (and liberating) perspective on those traditions.'<sup>70</sup>

A key feature of such critical interrogations of fundamental assumptions is that they can often disrupt, disturb and create spaces for voices which seek to challenge hegemonic discourses around peacebuilding. This includes a multitude of perspectives from the periphery, including the voices of those from outside the west. This, we believe, can only be of benefit to the practice of peacebuilding in the long-term. Indeed, without interrogation of fundamental assumptions and without input from peripheral voices, peacebuilding risks becoming ossified, unrepresentative and an imperial attempt to create peace in our own image.

### **Exploring Ways Forward**

If the Rotary Centers wish to undertake collaborative education for peacebuilding how are we to proceed? The workshop concept paper states that 'peacebuilding will require well over 5,000 professionals in the United Nations system around the world. Bilateral aid agencies and international NGOs will require more than double... that number of experts. Developing countries where activities will take place will need even more...trained people in peacebuilding'.

We are left with some central questions: How is Peacebuilding Education best understood? Who's interests does Peacebuilding serve? Who is it for? How should it be implemented in various circumstances? Where is knowledge about peacebuilding located? Who is best positioned to do the teaching? Who does the learning?

We believe that the conversation which emerges from attempts to answer these difficult questions become the primary focus for moving forward in addressing how the centers can improve peacebuilding components within their own programs and explore future collaboration.

However, we would like to put forward a number of concrete recommendations that may provide a basis for extending collaboration between the Rotary Centers and indeed between Rotary and the Centers:

1. Find ways to fund ongoing research collaboration between the centers on peacebuilding issues.
2. Institutionalize an annual conference on peacebuilding or aspects of peacebuilding.
3. Encourage interested Rotary Fellows to focus some of their research on peacebuilding and/or to assist senior academics in peacebuilding research.
4. Explore ways the Rotary Centers can strengthen and help facilitate trans-national communities of affinity and interest around peacebuilding, and real and virtual Diasporas of people interested in peacebuilding education. This might include incorporating representatives of such groups in any future conference on peacebuilding. It might also include a project to map these various communities and promote greater connectivity between them via the web.
5. A number of these initiatives imply the need for funding that would be additional to that already provided to the Centers from Rotary. Whether this is a realistic proposition is a question that only the Rotary will be able to answer. However, a more viable approach might be for Rotary to use its existing funding, or small increases in current funding, as a means to leverage in additional funds from other organizations (the Soros Foundation, Leverhulme, Macarthur etc) or even governments.

### **Concluding Comments**

In this paper we briefly looked at some of the practical ways in which the Department of Peace Studies at Bradford University currently undertakes education for and on, peacebuilding. It was also noted that, in this, the largest department of its kind, we see a spectrum of views on peacebuilding and a divergence between Research Centers on what peacebuilding is and should be. This echoes the broader divergences amongst both academics and practitioners over the best way to undertake peacebuilding efforts. In the hope of briefly mapping the territory, we then went on to look at a few viewpoints and conceptions of peacebuilding.

A case was then made that peacebuilding is a contentious and a highly debatable concept but that in the main, current considerations of peacebuilding may be too narrow. In addition, the findings of the High Level Panel and the broader turn to peacebuilding in the post-Cold War era were situated in the context of a particular securitization of underdevelopment, state collapse and threat which, we argued, is problematic in a number of respects.

Finally, we analyzed the role of education in peacebuilding and outlined three essential elements in peacebuilding education: the consideration of technical/problem solving issues, normative elements and critical approaches. We also outlined some suggestions for enhancing co-operation

on peacebuilding between the different Rotary Centers and for maximizing the potential that arises from existing Rotary funding. Of these we would particularly highlight the potential role of an annual conference, the importance of network facilitation and outreach to link transnational communities interested in peacebuilding and, finally, the potential to maximize resources for work on peacebuilding through building alliances between Rotary, the Centers and other funders.

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